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Abstract
Neural network robustness has recently been highlighted by the existence of ad-
versarial examples. Many previous works show that the learned networks do not
perform well on perturbed test data, and significantly more labeled data is required
to achieve adversarially robust generalization. In this paper, we theoretically and
empirically show that with just more unlabeled data, we can learn a model with
better adversarially robust generalization. The key insight of our results is based on
a risk decomposition theorem, in which the expected robust risk is separated into
two parts: the stability part which measures the prediction stability in the presence
of perturbations, and the accuracy part which evaluates the standard classification
accuracy. As the stability part does not depend on any label information, we
can optimize this part using unlabeled data. We further prove that for a specific
Gaussian mixture problem illustrated by [35], adversarially robust generalization
can be almost as easy as the standard generalization in supervised learning if a
sufficiently large amount of unlabeled data is provided. Inspired by the theoretical
findings, we propose a new algorithm called PASS by leveraging unlabeled data
during adversarial training. We show that in the transductive and semi-supervised
settings, PASS achieves higher robust accuracy and defense success rate on the
Cifar-10 task.
1 Introduction
Deep learning [18], especially deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [19], has led to state-of-
the-art results spanning many machine learning fields, such as image classification [36, 12, 14, 13],
object detection [33, 32, 21], semantic segmentation [23, 46, 7] and action recognition [40, 43, 44].
Despite the great success in numerous applications, recent studies show that deep CNNs are vul-
nerable to some well-designed input samples named as Adversarial Examples [37, 4]. Take image
classification as an example, for almost every commonly used well-performed CNN, attackers are
able to construct a small perturbation on an input image. The perturbation is almost imperceptible to
humans but can cause a wrong prediction by the model. The problem is serious as some designed
adversarial examples can be transferred among different kinds of CNN architectures [30], which
makes it possible to perform black-box attack: an attacker has no access to the model parameters or
even architecture, but can still easily fool a machine learning system.
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There is a rapidly growing body of work on studying how to obtain a robust neural network model.
Most of the successful methods are based on adversarial training [37, 24, 11, 15]. The high-level idea
of these works is that during training, we predict the strongest perturbation to each sample against
the current model and use the perturbed sample together with the correct label for gradient descent
optimization. However, the learned model tends to overfit on the training data and fails to keep robust
on unseen testing data. For example, using the state-of-the-art adversarial robust training method
[24], the defense success rate of the learned model on the testing data is below 60% while that on the
training data is almost 100%, which indicates that the robustness fails to generalize. Some theoretical
results further show that it is challenging to achieve adversarially robust generalization. [10] proves
that adversarial examples exist for any classifiers and can be transferred across different models,
making it impossible to design network architectures free from adversarial attacks. [35] shows that
adversarially robust generalization requires much more labeled data than standard generalization in
certain cases. [41] presents an inherent trade-off between accuracy and robust accuracy and argues
that the phenomenon comes from the fact that robust classifiers learn different features. Therefore it
is hard to reach high robustness for standard training methods.
Given the challenge of the task and previous findings, in this paper, we provide several theoretical
and empirical results towards better adversarially robust generalization. In particular, we show that
we can learn an adversarially robust model which generalizes well if we have plenty of unlabeled
data, and the labeled sample complexity for adversarially robust generalization in [35] can be largely
reduced if unlabeled data is used. Intuitively, imagine we hold a model (i.e. a classifier) and a sample.
We want to know whether the model’s prediction is correct and is robust to the sample. Apparently,
the correctness of the prediction can be obtained only if we know the ground truth label. However, to
evaluate the robustness, we can add perturbations to the sample and check whether the prediction
changes. Since such a way of evaluation does not require any label, we can measure and improve the
robustness of the model by leveraging unlabeled data.
First, we formalize the intuition above using the language of generalization theory. The core technique
is to decompose the upper bound of the expected robust risk into two terms: a stability term which
measures whether the model can output consistent predictions under perturbations, and an accuracy
term which evaluates whether the model can make correct predictions on natural samples. Given
the stability term does not rely on ground truth labels, unlabeled data can be used to minimize this
term and thus improve the generalization ability. Second, we prove that for the Gaussian mixture
problem defined in [35], if unlabeled data can be used, adversarially robust generalization will be
almost as easy as the standard generalization in supervised learning (i.e. using the same number of
labeled samples under similar conditions). Inspired by the theoretical findings, we think using labeled
and unlabeled data together during training is a natural way to learn a model for better adversarially
robust generalization. To achieve this, we design a PGD-based Adversarial training algorithm in
Semi-Supervised setting (PASS for short). On Cifar-10 task, we show that the PASS algorithm can
achieve better performance on adversarially robust generalization.
Our contributions are in three folds.
• In Section 3.2.1, we provide a theorem to show that unlabeled data can be naturally used to
improve the expected robust risk in general setting and thus leveraging unlabeled data is a
way to improve adversarially robust generalization.
• In Section 3.2.2, we discuss a specific Gaussian mixture problem introduced in [35]. In [35],
the authors proved that in this case, the labeled sample complexity for robust generalization
is significantly larger than that for standard generalization. As an extension to this work, we
prove that in this case, the labeled sample complexity for robust generalization can be the
same as that for standard generalization if we have enough unlabeled data.
• According to our theoretical results, we design an adversarial robust training algorithm
using both labeled and unlabeled data. We name our algorithm PASS. Our experimental
results show that in the transductive and semi-supervised settings, PASS achieves better
performance compared to the baseline algorithms.
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2 Related Works
2.1 Adversarial Attacks and Defense
Most previous works study how to attack a neural network model using small perturbations under
certain norm constraints, such as l∞ norm or l2 norm. For the l∞ constraint, Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [11] finds a direction to which the perturbation increases the classification loss at an
input point to the greatest extent; Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [24] extends FGSM by updating
the direction of the attack in an iterative manner and clipping the modifications in the norm range
after each iteration. For the l2 constraint, DeepFool [28] iteratively computes the minimal norm of
an adversarial perturbation by linearizing around the input in each iteration. C&W attack [6] is a
comprehensive approach that works under both norm constraints. In this work, we focus on learning a
robust model to defend the white-box attack, i.e. we assume we are in the worst case that the attacker
knows the model parameters and thus can use the algorithms above to attack models.
There are a large number of papers about defending against adversarial attacks, but the result is
far from satisfactory. Remarkably, [1] shows most defense methods take advantage of so-called
“gradient mask” and provides an attacking method called BPDA to correct the gradients. A recent
paper [20] proposes a powerful black-box attack called NAttack, which fools most previous defenses
with a high success rate. So far, adversarial training [24] has been the most successful white-box
defense algorithm. By modeling the learning problem as a mini-max game between the attacker and
defender, the robust model can be trained using iterative optimization methods.
2.2 Semi-supervised/Transductive Learning
Using unlabeled data to help the learning process has been proved promising in different applications
[31, 45, 9]. Many approaches use regularizers called “soft constraints” to make the model “behave”
well on unlabeled data. For example, transductive SVM [16] uses prediction confidence as a soft
constraint, and graph-based SSL [3, 38] requires the model to have similar outputs at endpoints of
an edge. The most related work to ours is the consistency-based SSL. It uses consistency as a soft
constraint, which encourages the model to make consistent predictions on unlabeled data when a
small perturbation is added. The consistency metric can be either computed by the model’s own
predictions, such as the Π model [34], Temporal Ensembling [17] and Virtual Adversarial Training
[25], or by the predictions of a teacher model, such as the mean teacher model [39].
Although our method looks similar to those algorithms, it has a totally different starting point and
focusing on a different problem. The goal of the consistency-based approach is to improve standard
generalization by designing auxiliary regularization on unlabeled data. Most of the works do not
have any theoretical guarantees. On the contrary, in our work, we show that the unlabeled data can be
naturally used to improve generalization for robust machine learning problems from a theoretical
perspective. We derive theoretical bounds, show better sample complexity and design practical
algorithms to demonstrate its strength.
3 Main Results
In this section, we first illustrate the benefits of using unlabeled data for robust generalization from a
theoretical perspective. Then we develop a practical algorithm based on the theoretical findings.
3.1 Notations and Definitions
We consider a standard classification task with an underlying data distribution PXY over pairs of
examples x ∈ Rd and corresponding labels y ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}. Usually PXY is unknown and we
can only access to S = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} in which (xi, yi) is independent and identically
drawn from PXY , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. For ease of reference, we denote this empirical distribution as
PˆXY (i.e. the uniform distribution over i.i.d. sampled data). We also assume that we are given a
suitable loss function l(f(x), y), where f ∈ F is parameterized by θ. The standard loss function
is the zero-one loss, i.e. l0/1(y′, y) = I[y′ 6= y]. Due to its discontinuous and non-differentiable
nature, surrogate loss functions such as cross-entropy or mean square loss are commonly used during
optimization.
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Our goal is to find an f ∈ F that minimizes the expected classification risk. Without loss of any
generality, our theory is mainly based on the binary classification problem, i.e. K = 2. All theorems
below can be easily extended to the multi-class classification problem. For a binary classification
problem, the expected classification risk is defined as below.
Definition 1. (Expected classification risk). Let PXY be a probability distribution over Rd × {±1}.
The expected classification risk R of a classifier f : Rd → {−1, 1} under distribution PXY and loss
function l is defined as R = E(x,y)∼PXY l(f(x), y).
We use R(f) to denote the classification risk under the underlying distribution and use Rˆ(f) to
denote the classification risk under the empirical distribution. We use R0/1(f) to denote the risk
with the zero-one loss function. The classification risk characterizes whether the model f is accurate.
However, we also care about whether f is robust. For example, when input x is an image, we hope
a small change (perturbation) to x will not change the prediction of f . To this end, [35] defines
expected robust classification risk as below.
Definition 2. (Expected robust classification risk). Let PXY be a probability distribution over
Rd × {±1} and B : Rd → P (Rd) be a perturbation set. Then the B-robust classification risk
RB−robust of a classifier f : Rd → {−1, 1} under distribution PXY and loss function l is defined as
RB−robust = E(x,y)∼PXY supx′∈B(x) l(f(x′), y).
Again, we use RB−robust(f) to denote the expected robust classification risk under the underlying
distribution and use RˆB−robust(f) to denote the expected robust classification risk under the empirical
distribution. We use R0/1B−robust(f) to denote the robust risk with the zero-one loss function. In real
practice, the most commonly used setting is the perturbation under -bounded l∞ norm constraint
B∞(x) =
{
x′ ∈ Rd| ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ ε
}
. For simplicity, we refer to the robustness defined by this
perturbation set as `∞-robustness.
Before presenting our main theoretical results, we briefly introduce the motivation of the work. As
we can see from Definition 2, the robust classification risk concerns about whether f can correctly
predict the label for all x′ around x. We notice that testing whether f is robustly accurate or not
can be achieved by answering two questions separately: Whether f provides a correct prediction on
x, and whether f changes its prediction on any x′ around x? It is easy to see that f(x) is robustly
accurate if and only if the answers to the two questions are Yes. Based on this, we actually decompose
the problem into two parts. One part concerns about whether f is accurate and the other part concerns
about whether f is robust. Considering the second one (i.e. whether f changes its prediction on any
x′ around x) does not require any label information, we think the robustness can be improved with
more unlabeled data.
3.2 Robust Generalization Analysis
Our first result (Section 3.2.1) shows that unlabeled data can be used to improve adversarially robust
generalization in general setting. Our second result (Section 3.2.2) shows that for a specific learning
problem defined on Gaussian mixture model, compared to previous work [35], the sample complexity
of the robust generalization can be significantly reduced by using unlabeled data. Both results suggest
that using unlabeled data is a natural way to improve adversarially robust generalization. Due to
space limitation, we put all detailed proofs of the theorems and lemmas into appendix.
3.2.1 General Results
In this subsection, we show that the expected robust classification risk can be bounded by the sum
of two terms. The first term only depends on the hypothesis space and the unlabeled data, and the
second term is a standard PAC bound.
Theorem 1. Let F be the hypothesis space. Let S = (xi, yi)ni=1 be the set of n i.i.d. samples drawn
from the underlying distribution PXY . For any function f ∈ F , with probability at least 1− δ over
the random draw of S, we have
R
0/1
B−robust(f) ≤ Ex∼PX sup
x′∈B(x)
(I(f(x′) 6= f(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+ Rˆ0/1(f) +RadS(F) + 3
√
log 2δ
2n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
, (1)
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where (1) is a term that can be optimized with only unlabeled data and (2) is the standard PAC
generalization bound. PX is the marginal distribution for PXY and RadS(F) is the empirical
Rademacher complexity of hypothesis space F .
From Theorem 1, we can see that the expected robust classification risk is bounded by the sum
of two terms: the first term only involves the marginal distribution PX and the second term is the
standard PAC generalization error bound. This shows that the expected robust risk minimization can
be achieved by jointly optimizing the two terms simultaneously: we can optimize the first term using
unlabeled data sampled from PX and optimize the second term using labeled data sampled from
PXY , which is the same as the standard supervised learning.
While [8] suggests that in the standard PAC learning scenario (only labeled data is considered), the
generalization gap of robust risk can be sometimes uncontrollable by the capacity of hypothesis space
F , our results show that we can mitigate this problem by introducing unlabeled data. In fact, our
following result shows that with enough unlabeled data, learning a robust model can be almost as
easy as learning a standard model.
3.2.2 Learning from Gaussian Mixture Model
The learning problem defined on Gaussian mixture model is illustrated in [35] as an example to show
adversarially robust generalization needs much more labeled data compared to standard generalization.
In this subsection, we show that for this specific problem, just using more unlabeled data is enough to
achieve adversarially robust generalization. For completeness, we first list the results in [35] and then
show our theoretical findings.
Definition 3. (Gaussian mixture model [35]). Let θ∗ ∈ Rd be the per-class mean vector and let σ > 0
be the variance parameter. Then the (θ∗, σ)-Gaussian mixture model is defined by the following
distribution PXY over (x, y) ∈ Rd×{±1}: First, draw a label y ∈ {±1} uniformly at random. Then
sample the data point x ∈ Rd from N (y · θ∗, σ2Id).
Given the samples from the distribution defined above, the learning problem is to find a linear
classifier to predict label y from x. [35] proved the following sample complexity bound for standard
generalization.
Theorem 2. (Theorem 4 in [35]). Let (x, y) be drawn from the (θ?, σ)-Gaussian mixture model with
‖θ?‖2 =
√
d and σ ≤ c · d1/4 where c is a universal constant. Let wˆ ∈ Rd be the vector wˆ = y · x.
Then with high probability, the expected classification risk of the linear classifier fwˆ using 0-1 loss is
at most 1%.
Theorem 2 suggests that we can learn a linear classifier with low classification risk (e.g., 1%) even if
there is only one labeled data. However, the following theorem shows that for adversarially robust
generalization under `∞ perturbation, significantly more labeled data is required.
Theorem 3. (Theorem 6 in [35]). Let gn be any learning algorithm, i.e. a function from n samples
to a binary classifier fn. Moreover, let σ = c1 · d1/4, let  ≥ 0, and let θ ∈ Rd be drawn from
N (0, Id). We also draw n samples from the (θ, σ)-Gaussian mixture model. Then the expected
`∞-robust classification risk of fn using 0-1 loss is at least
1
2 (1− 1/d) if the number of labeled data
n ≤ c2 2
√
d
log d .
As we can see from above theorem, the sample complexity of robust generalization is larger than
that of standard generalization by
√
d. This shows that for high-dimensional problems, adversarial
robustness can provably require a significantly larger number of samples. We provide a new result
which shows that the learned model can be robust if there is only one labeled data and sufficiently
many unlabeled data. Our theorem is stated as follow:
Theorem 4. Let (xL, yL) be a labeled data drawn from (θ∗, σ)-Gaussian mixture model PXY with
‖θ∗‖2 =
√
d and σ = O(d1/4). Let xU1 , · · · , xUn be n unlabeled data drawn from PX . Let v ∈ Rd
such that v ∈ argmax‖v‖=1
∑n
i=1(v
>xUi )
2. Let wˆ = sign(yL ·v>xL)v. Then there exists a constant
D such that for any d ≥ D, with high probability, the expected `∞-robust classification risk of fwˆ
using 0-1 loss is at most 1% when the number of unlabeled data n = Ω(d log d) and  ≤ 12 .
From Theorem 4, we can see that when the number of unlabeled data is significant, we can learn a
highly accurate and robust model using only one labeled data. The learning process can be intuitively
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described as the following three steps: in the first step, we use unlabeled data to estimate the direction
of θ∗ although we do not know the label that θ∗ (or −θ∗) corresponds to. In the second step, we use
the given labeled data to determine the “sign” of θ∗ with high probability. Finally, we give a good
estimation of θ∗ by combining the two step above and learn a robust classifier. The three key lemmas
corresponding to the three steps are listed as below (ci are constants for i = 0, 1, 2, 3).
Lemma 1. Under the same setting as Theorem 4, suppose that n > d and σ
√
σ2 + 1
√
d
n <
1
128 .
Then, with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
c3
σ ,(
c3
σ )
2}, there is a unique unit maximal eigenvector
v of the sample covariance matrix Σˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 x
U
i x
U>
i such that
∥∥∥v − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥
2
≤ c0σ
√
σ2+1
n + c3.
Lemma 2. Under the same setting as Theorem 4, suppose v is a unit vector such that
∥∥∥v − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥
2
≤ τ
for some constant τ <
√
2. Then with probability at least 1− exp(−d(1− τ
2
2 )
2
2σ2 ), we have sign(y
L ·
v>xL)v>θ∗ > 0.
Lemma 3. (Lemma 20 in [35]). Under the same setting as Theorem 4, for any p ≥ 1 and  ≥ 0, and
for any unit vector wˆ such that 〈wˆ, θ?〉 ≥  ‖wˆ‖∗p , where ‖ · ‖∗p is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖p, the linear
classifier fwˆ has `p -robust classification risk at most exp
(
− (〈wˆ,θ
∗〉−‖wˆ‖∗p)
2
2σ2
)
.
Our theoretical findings suggest that we can improve the adversarially robust generalization using
unlabeled data, and in the next subsection, we will present a practical algorithm for real applications.
Algorithm 1 PGD-based Adversarial training in Semi-Supervised setting (PASS)
1: Input: Datasets SL and SU . Hypothesis space F . Coefficient λ. PGD step size δ. Number of
PGD steps k. Maximum l∞ norm of perturbation .
2: for each iteration do
3: Sample a mini-batch of labeled data SˆL from SL.
4: Sample a mini-batch of unlabeled data SˆU from SU .
5: for each x ∈ SˆL ∪ SˆU do
6: Fix f and attack x with PGD-(k, , δ) on loss L1/L2 to obtain x′.
7: Perform gradient descent on f over the perturbed samples on loss LSSL.
8: end for
9: end for
3.3 Practical Algorithm
Let SL = {(xL1 , yL1 ), · · · , (xLn , yLn )} be a set of labeled data and SU = {xU1 , · · · , xUm} be a set of
unlabeled data. Motivated by the theory above, to achieve better adversarially robust generalization,
we can optimize the classifier to be accurate on SL and robust on SL ∪ SU . This is also equivalent to
learn the classifier to be accurate and robust on SL and robust on SU . Therefore, we design two loss
terms on SL and SU separately.
For the labeled dataset SL, we use the standard `∞-robust adversarial training objective function, i.e.,
L1(f, S
L) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
x′i∈B∞(xi)
lCE(f(x′i), yi).
Following the most common setting, during training, the classifier outputs a probability dis-
tribution over categories and is evaluated by cross-entropy loss defined as lCE(f(x), y) =
−∑Kk=1 log fk(x)I[y = k], where fk(x) is the output probability for category k.
For unlabeled data SU , we use an objective function which measures robustness without ground truth
L2(f, S
U ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
max
x′i∈B∞(xi)
lCE(f(x′i), yˆi),where yˆi = argmaxk{fk(xi)}.
Putting the two objective functions together, our training loss is defined as a combination of L1 and
L2 as follows:
LSSL(f, SL, SU ) = L1(f, S
L) + λL2(f, S
U ). (2)
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Here λ > 0 is a coefficient to trade off the two loss terms. In real practice, we use iterative
optimization methods to learn the function f . In the inner loop, we fix the model and use Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) algorithm to learn the attack x′ for any x. In the outer loop, we use stochastic
gradient descent to optimize f on the perturbed x′s. We call our algorithm: PGD-based Adversarial
training in Semi-Supervised setting PASS. The general training process is shown in Algorithm 1.
4 Experiments
We use the Cifar-10 task to verify our proposed algorithm. In particular, given a set of labeled
and unlabeled data, we study two settings: the transductive setting in which the testing data is the
given unlabeled data, and the semi-supervised setting in which the testing data is a set of unseen
data during training. All codes and models are available at https://github.com/RuntianZ/
adversarial-robustness-unlabeled.
4.1 Experimental Setting
Following [24], we use the Resnet model and modify the network incorporating wider layers by a
factor of 10. This results in a network with five residual units with (16, 160, 320, 640) filters each.
During training, we apply data augmentation including random crops and flips, as well as per image
standardization. The initial learning rate is 0.1, and decay by a factor of 10 twice during training.
In the inner loop, we run a 7-step PGD with step size 2/255 for each mini-batch. The perturbation is
constrained to be 8/255 under l∞ norm.
Transductive learning setting. In the transductive setting, the algorithm has access to all labeled
training data and all unlabeled test data. In the Cifar-10 task, we use the 50k labeled training images
as SL and the 10k test images as SU and set λ = 0.125. Each mini-batch contains 100 sampled
labeled images and 20 sampled unlabeled images. Learning rate is decayed at the 60th and the 120th
epoch. We compare our proposed method with several baselines which use labeled training data
only, including the original PGD-based adversarial training [24], thermometer encoding [5], cascade
learning [29] and ADV-BNN [22].
Semi-supervised learning setting. In the semi-supervised learning setting, the unlabeled data are
no longer coming from the test set, hence it is a better way to measure whether more unlabeled data
can help adversarially robust generalization. Following many previous works [17, 39, 25, 2], we
sample 5k/10k labeled data from the training set and use them as labeled data. We mask out the labels
of the remaining images in the training set and use them as unlabeled data. By doing this, we conduct
two semi-supervised learning tasks and call them the 5k/10k experiments. In a mini-batch, we sample
25/50 labeled images and 225/200 unlabeled images for the 5k/10k experiment respectively. In both
experiments, we use several different values of λ as an ablation study for this hyperparameter by
setting λ = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. Learning rate is decayed at the 60th and the 120th epoch. We use the
original PGD-based adversarial training [24] on the sampled 5k/10k labeled data as the baseline
algorithm for comparison (referred to as PGD-adv).
Defenses
Attacks Natural FGSM PGD-7 PGD-40 BPDA [1] NAttack [20]
PGD-7 adv. training 85.40 59.05 49.99 47.54 47 45.48
Therm. encoding [5] 89.88 80.96 79.16 - 0 7.79
Cascade learning [29] 91.5 69.1 42.5 - 15 1.74
ADV-BNN [22] 80.09 64.94 57.59 48.00 41.20 19.69
PASS (transductive) 86.20 86.19 86.02 85.50 85.50 86.19
Table 1: Test Accuracy of Models with Different Attacks (%)
4.2 Experimental Results
Transductive learning setting In Table 1, we report the robust test accuracy of different models
using different attack methods in the transductive setting. The attack methods include FGSM [11], 7-
7
step PGD (referred to as PGD-7), 40-step PGD (referred to as PGD-40), BPDA [1] and NAttack [20].
All attacks are limited to 8/255 in terms of l∞ norm. We also report the test accuracy on the original
test data (referred to as natural accuracy).
From the table, we can clearly see that PASS in transductive setting is significantly better than all
other baselines for more than 30 points under different attacks. Furthermore, the defense success
rate of PASS (which is computed by robust accuracynatural accuracy ) is more than 99% under PGD-40 attack which is
even stronger than the attack (PGD-7) used during training. This indicates that the model learned
from PASS is very robust if it produces a correct prediction. Actually, this experimental result is
predictable since the algorithm explicitly imposes regularization on the robustness of the test data.
Natural
Train
Accuracy
Natural
Test
Accuracy
Robust
Train
Accuracy
Robust
Test
Accuracy
Defense
Success
Rate
5k
PGD-adv on 5k 61.18 60.57 32.40 30.54 50.42
PASS (λ=0.1) 63.24 60.44 32.97 30.90 51.13
PASS (λ=0.2) 61.73 60.71 35.20 32.96 54.29
PASS (λ=0.3) 61.88 60.46 35.07 33.54 55.47
10k
PGD-adv on 10k 78.80 73.79 45.60 37.48 50.79
PASS (λ=0.1) 78.24 72.92 47.96 38.86 53.29
PASS (λ=0.2) 78.74 73.16 51.20 41.18 56.29
PASS (λ=0.3) 78.95 73.35 52.24 42.48 57.91
PGD-adv on 50k 99.91 85.40 96.71 49.99 58.54
Table 2: SSL experiment with 5k/10k labeled points (%)
Semi-supervised learning setting. We list all results of the 5k/10k experiments in Table 2. We
use five criteria to evaluate the performance of the model: the natural training/test accuracy, the robust
training/test accuracy using PGD-7 attack and the defense success rate.
First, we can see that in both experiments, the robust test accuracy is improved when we use unlabeled
data. For example, the robust test accuracy of the models trained by PASS with λ = 0.3 for the
5k/10k experiments increase by 3.0/5.0 percents compared to the PGD-adv baselines. We also check
the defense success rate which evaluates whether the model is robust given the prediction is correct.
As we can see from the last column in Table 2, the defense success rate of models trained using our
proposed method is much higher than the baselines. In particular, the defense success rate of the
model trained with λ = 0.3 in the 10k experiment is competitive to the model trained using PGD-adv
on the whole dataset. This clearly shows the advantage of our proposed algorithm.
Second, we can also see the influence of the value of λ. The model trained with a larger λ has higher
robust accuracy. For example, in the 10k experiment, the robust test accuracy of the model trained
with λ = 0.3 is more than 3% better than that with λ = 0.1. However, we observe that training will
become hard to converge if λ > 0.5.
VAT [26] uses an adversarial regularization over the unlabeled data but the goal is to improve natural
test accuracy. In our experiment, as can be seen from the table, PASS improves robust test accuracy
more than natural test accuracy. One of the differences between PASS and VAT is that VAT uses
one-step gradient method to attack during training, which is known to be a very weak attack and
cannot lead to robust models [24] (more experimental results are provided in the appendix). In our
work, we focus on improving network robustness and use a much stronger attack (7-step PGD) during
training. For unlabeled data when defending against a weak attack during training, the model can
not be learned to be robust but might tend to generalize toward “accuracy”; However, for unlabeled
data, when defending against a strong attack during training, the model will be learned to minimize
the expected robust risk. Therefore, the model tends to generalize toward “robustness”, which is
consistent with our theory.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we theoretically and empirically show that with just more unlabeled data, we can
learn model with better adversarially robust generalization. We first give an expected robust risk
decomposition theorem and then show that for a specific learning problem on Gaussian mixture
model, the adversarially robust generalization can be almost as easy as standard generalization. Based
on these theoretical results, we propose a new algorithm called PASS which leverages unlabeled
data during training and empirically show its advantage. As future work, we will study the sample
complexity of unlabeled data for broader function classes and solve more challenging real tasks.
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A Background on Generalization and Rademacher Complexity
The Rademacher complexity is a commonly used capacity measure for a hypothesis space.
Definition 4. Given a set S = {x1, ..., xn} of n samples, the empirical Rademacher complexity of
function class F (mapping from Rd to R) is defined as:
RadS(F) = 1
n
E
[
sup
f∈F
n∑
i=1
if(xi)
]
,
where  = (1, · · · , n)> contains i.i.d. random variables drawn from the Rademacher distribution
unif({1, -1}).
By using the Rademacher complexity, we can directly provide an upper bound on the generalization
error.
Theorem 5. (Theorem 3.5 in [27]). Suppose l(·, ·) is the 0− 1 loss, let S = (xi, yi)ni=1 be the set of
n i.i.d. samples drawn from the underlining distribution PXY . Let F be the hypothesis space, then
with probability at least 1− δ over S, for any f ∈ F:
R(f) ≤ Rˆ(f) +RadS(F) + 3
√
log 2δ
2n
B Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For indicator function I, we have for any x,
I(f(x′) 6= y) ≤ I(f(x) 6= y) + I(f(x) 6= f(x′)). (3)
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According to Definition 2, we have
RB−robust(f) = E(x,y)∼PXY sup
x′∈B(x)
l(f(x′), y) = E(x,y)∼PXY sup
x′∈B(x)
I(f(x′) 6= y)
≤ E(x,y)∼PXY sup
x′∈B(x)
(I(f(x) 6= y) + I(f(x) 6= f(x′))) (4)
= Ex∼PX sup
x′∈B(x)
(I(f(x′) 6= f(x)) + E(x,y)∼PXY l(f(x), y)
= Ex∼PX sup
x′∈B(x)
(I(f(x′) 6= f(x)) +R(f),
where (4) is derived from (3). We further use Theorem 5 to bound R(f). It is easy to verify that with
probability at least 1− δ, for any f ∈ F :
RB−robust(f) ≤ Ex∼PX sup
x′∈B(x)
(I(f(x′) 6= f(x)) +R(f)
≤ Ex∼PX sup
x′∈B(x)
(I(f(x′) 6= f(x)) + Rˆ(f) +RadS(F) + 3
√
log 2δ
2n
which completes the proof.
C Proof of Theorem 4
For convenience, in this section, we use ci or c′i to denote some universal constants, where i =
0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
In the proof of Theorem 4, we will use the concentration bound for covariance estimation in [42]. We
first introduce the definition of spiked covariance ensemble.
Definition 5. (Spiked covariance ensemble). A sample xi ∈ Rd from the spiked covariance ensemble
takes the form
xi =
√
νξiθ0 + wi,
where ξi ∈ R is a zero-mean random variable with unit variance, ν ∈ R is a fixed scalar, θ0 ∈ Rd
is a fixed vector and wi ∈ Rd is a random vector independent of ξi, with zero mean and covariance
matrix Id.
To see why spiked covariance ensemble model is useful, we note that the Gaussian mixture model
is its special case. Specifically, let xUi ’s be the unlabeled data in Theorem 4. Then x
U
i follows
the Gaussian mixture distribution 12N (θ∗, σ2Id) + 12N (−θ∗, σ2Id), and x
U
i
σ is a spiked covariance
ensemble with parameter ν = 1σ2 , ξi uniformly distributed on {±1}, wi ∼ N (0, Id) and θ0 = θ∗.
The following theorem from [42] characterizes the concentration property of spiked covariance
ensemble, which we will further use to bound the robust classification error. Intuitively, the theorem
says that we can approximately recover θ0 in the spiked covariance ensemble model using the top
eigenvector θˆ of the sample covariance matrix Σˆ.
Theorem 6. (Concentration of covariance estimation, see Corollary 8.7 in [42]). Given i.i.d. samples
{xi}ni=1 from the spiked covariance ensemble with sub-Gaussian tails (which means both ξi and wi
are sub-Gaussian with parameter at most one), suppose that n > d and
√
ν+1
ν2
√
d
n <
1
128 . Then,
with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
√
νc3,νc
2
3}, there is a unique maximal eigenvector θˆ of the
sample covariance matrix Σˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xix
>
i such that∥∥∥θˆ − θ0∥∥∥
2
≤ c0
√
ν + 1
ν2
√
d
n
+ c3.
Using the theorem above, we can show that for the Gaussian mixture model, one of the top unit eigen-
vector of the sample covariance matrix is approximately θ
∗√
d
. In other words, we can approximately
recover the parameter θ∗ up to a sign difference: the principal component analysis of Σˆ gives either
v or −v, while θ∗√
d
is close to v.
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Lemma 4. Under the same setting as Theorem 4, suppose that n > d and σ
√
σ2 + 1
√
d
n <
1
128 .
Then, with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
c3
σ ,(
c3
σ )
2}, there is a unique maximal eigenvector v of
the sample covariance matrix Σˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 x
U
i x
U>
i with unit `2 norm such that∥∥∥∥v − θ∗√d
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ τ0 = min{c0σ
√
σ2 + 1
n
+ c3,
√
2}
Proof. As discussed above, x
U
i
σ is a spiked covariance ensemble. By Theorem 6 we have with
probability at least 1− c1e−c′2nmin{
c′3
σ ,(
c′3
σ )
2}, there is a unique maximal eigenvector v˜ of the sample
covariance matrix Σˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 x
U
i x
U>
i such that∥∥∥∥v˜ − θ∗√d
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ c′0σ
√
σ2 + 1
n
+ c′3.
Let τ = c′0σ
√
σ2+1
n + c
′
3, we have
∥∥∥v˜ − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥
2
≤ τ . Below we need to consider two cases, τ ≤ 1
and τ > 1.
Case 1: τ ≤ 1. Let v = v˜‖v˜‖ , since both v and θ
∗√
d
are unit vectors, we have∥∥∥∥v − θ∗√d
∥∥∥∥2 = ‖v‖2 + ∥∥∥∥ θ∗√d
∥∥∥∥2 − 2〈v, θ∗√d 〉 = 2− 2〈v, θ∗√d 〉 (5)
Recall that
∥∥∥v˜ − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥
2
≤ τ , which is equivalent to
τ2 ≥ ‖v˜‖2 +
∥∥∥∥ θ∗√d
∥∥∥∥2 − 2〈v˜, θ∗√d 〉
= ‖v˜‖2 + 1− 2 ‖v˜‖ 〈v, θ
∗
√
d
〉
Rearranging the terms and using AM-GM inequality gives
2〈v, θ
∗
√
d
〉 ≥ ‖v‖+ 1− τ
2
‖v‖ ≥ 2
√
1− τ2
Therefore, by (5), ∥∥∥∥v − θ∗√d
∥∥∥∥ =
√
2− 2〈v, θ
∗
√
d
〉
≤
√
2− 2
√
1− τ2
=
√
2τ2
1 +
√
1− τ2
≤
√
2τ
=
√
2(c′0σ
√
σ2 + 1
n
+ c′3)
By substituting c0 =
√
2c′0, c2 =
1
2c
′
2 and c3 =
√
2c′3, we complete the proof.
Case 2: τ > 1. Let v be one of ± v˜‖v˜‖ such that the the inner product 〈v, θ∗〉 is nonnegative. Since
both v and θ
∗√
d
are unit vectors, we have∥∥∥∥v − θ∗√d
∥∥∥∥2 = ‖v‖2 + ∥∥∥∥ θ∗√d
∥∥∥∥2 − 2〈v, θ∗√d 〉 = 2− 2√d 〈v, θ∗〉 ≤ 2
Therefore,
∥∥∥v − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥ ≤ √2 = τ0.
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Now we have proved that by using the top eigenvector of Σˆ, we can recover the θ∗ up to a sign
difference. Next, we will show that it is possible to determine the sign using the labeled data.
Lemma 5. Under the same setting as Theorem 4, suppose v ∈ Rd is a unit vector such that∥∥∥v − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥
2
≤ τ0 where τ0 ≤
√
2. Then with probability at least 1 − exp
(
−d(1−
τ20
2 )
2
2σ2
)
, we have
sign(yL · v>xL)v>θ∗ > 0.
Proof. Since
∥∥∥v − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥
2
≤ √2, and both v and θ∗√
d
are unit vectors, we have v>θ∗ > 0. So the
event {sign(yL · v>xL)v>θ∗ ≤ 0} is equivalent to the event {yL · v>xL ≤ 0}, i.e.
P[sign(yL · v>xL)v>θ∗ ≤ 0] = P[yL · v>xL ≤ 0] (6)
Recall that xL is sampled from the Gaussian distribution N (yL · θ∗, σ2Id), where yL is sampled
uniformly at random from {±1}, we have (yLxL) follows the Gaussian distribution N (θ∗, σ2Id).
Hence,
P[yL · v>xL ≤ 0] = P(yLxL)∼N (θ∗,σ2Id)[v>(yLxL) ≤ 0] = Pg∼N (0,1)
[
g ≤ −θ
∗ · v
σ
]
(7)
Moreover, from
∥∥∥v − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥2
2
≤ τ20 we can get
〈θ∗, v〉 ≥
√
d(1− τ
2
0
2
) (8)
So, using the Gaussian tail bound PX∼N (0,1)[X ≤ −t] ≤ exp(−t2) for all t ∈ R, and combining
with (6), (7), (8), we have
P[sign(yL · v>xL)v>θ∗ ≤ 0] ≤ exp
(
−d(1−
τ20
2 )
2
2σ2
)
,
as stated in the lemma.
Armed with Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we now have a precise estimation of θ∗ in the Gaussian mixture
model. Then, we will show that the high precision of the estimation can be translated to low robust
risk. To achieve this, we need a lemma from [35], which upper bounds the robust classification risk
of a linear classifier wˆ in terms of its inner product with θ∗.
Lemma 6. (Lemma 20 in [35]). Under the same setting as in Theorem 4, for any p ≥ 1 and  ≥ 0,
and for any unit vector wˆ ∈ Rd such that 〈wˆ, θ?〉 ≥  ‖wˆ‖∗p , where ‖ · ‖∗p is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖p,
the linear classifier fwˆ has `p -robust classification risk at most exp
(
− (〈wˆ,θ
∗〉−‖wˆ‖∗p)
2
2σ2
)
.
Lemma 6 guarantees that if we can estimate θ? precisely, we can achieve small robust classification
risk. Combine with Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 which provide such estimation, we are now ready to
prove the robust classification risk bound stated in Theorem 4. We can actually prove a slightly more
general theorem below with some extra parameters, and obtain Theorem 4 as a corollary.
Theorem 7. Let (xL, yL) be a labeled data drawn from (θ∗, σ)-Gaussian mixture model PXY with
‖θ∗‖2 =
√
d. Let xU1 , · · · , xUn be n unlabeled data drawn from PX . Let τ0 be as stated in Lemma 4,
and v ∈ Rd be the normalized eigenvector (i.e. ‖v‖2 = 1) with respect to the maximal eigenvalue
of
∑n
i=1 x
U
i x
U>
i such that
∥∥∥v − θ∗√
d
∥∥∥
2
≤ τ0 with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
c3
σ ,(
c3
σ )
2}. Let
wˆ = sign(yL · v>xL)v. Then with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
c3
σ ,(
c3
σ )
2}− exp(−d(1−
τ20
2 )
2
2σ2 ),
the linear classifier fwˆ has `∞-robust classification risk at most β when
 ≤ 1− τ
2
0
2
−
σ
√
2 log 1β√
d
. (9)
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Proof. By the choice of v we have (8) holds, i.e.
〈θ∗, v〉 ≥
√
d(1− τ
2
0
2
), (10)
with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
c3
σ ,(
c3
σ )
2}.
Applying Lemma 5 to v yields
sign(yL · v>xL)v>θ∗ > 0, (11)
with probability at least 1− exp(−d(1−
τ20
2 )
2
2σ2 ).
Notice that wˆ = sign(yL · v>xL)v. So by union bound on events (10) and (11), we have
〈θ∗, wˆ〉 = sign(yL · v>xL)〈θ∗, v〉 ≥
√
d(1− τ
2
0
2
), (12)
with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
c3
σ ,(
c3
σ )
2} − exp(−d(1−
τ20
2 )
2
2σ2 ).
Since ‖wˆ‖2 = 1, we have
‖wˆ‖∗∞ = ‖wˆ‖1 ≤
√
d. (13)
By Lemma 6, we have the `∞-robust error is upper bounded by
RB−robust(fwˆ) ≤ exp
(
− (〈wˆ, θ
∗〉 − ‖wˆ‖∗∞)2
2σ2
)
.
Combining this with (12), (13) and the assumption (9), we have
〈wˆ, θ∗〉 − ‖wˆ‖∗∞ ≥
√
d(1− τ
2
0
2
)−
√
d
1− τ20
2
−
σ
√
2 log 1β√
d
 = σ√2 log 1
β
.
Hence,
RB−robust(fwˆ) ≤ exp
−
(
σ
√
2 log 1β
)2
2σ2
 = β,
with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
c3
σ ,(
c3
σ )
2}− exp(−d(1−
τ20
2 )
2
2σ2 ), as stated in the theorem.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4: Let c be a constant such that σ ≤ c · d1/4 for sufficiently large d. Notice that
the wˆ in Theorem 4 is same as the wˆ in Theorem 7 since the maximal eigenvector of
∑n
i=1 x
U
i x
U>
i
also maximizes
∑n
i=1(v
>xUi )
2 over the unit sphere ‖v‖ = 1, v ∈ Rd. Theorem 7 guarantees that
with probability at least 1− c1e−c2nmin{
c3
σ ,(
c3
σ )
2} − exp(−d(1−
τ20
2 )
2
2σ2 ), `

∞-robust classification risk
is less then β = 0.01 for
 ≤ 1− τ
2
0
2
−
σ
√
2 log 1β√
d
= 1− τ
2
0
2
−
c
√
2 log 1β
d1/4
.
Choose c3 to be 12 . Since n = Ω(d log d),
1
2 ≤ τ0 = c0σ
√
σ2+1
n +c3 ≤ c4√log d+ 12 , and consequently
τ20 ≤ 14 + c4√log d +
c24
log d . So by Theorem 7, with probability at least 1− c1 exp
(
−c′2
√
d log d
)
−
15
exp
(
−
√
d( 14+
c4√
log d
+
c24
log d )
2c2
)
, `∞-robust classification risk is less then β = 0.01 for
 ≤ 1− τ
2
0
2
−
c
√
2 log 1β
d1/4
≤ 3
4
−
c
√
2 log 1β
d1/4
.
Since c4, c are numerical constants, there exists a constant D such that when d ≥ D, `∞-robust
classification risk is less then β = 0.01 for  ≤ 12 , thus we have completed the proof.
D More experiments
We make more empirical study to compare VAT and our proposed PASS algorithm as they both use
unlabeled data. The experimental results are shown in Table 1. As we can see from the table, in
the 5k/10k experiment, VAT achieves relatively higher natural training/test accuracy. However, the
robust training/testing of VAT are significantly worse which are near zero. This shows that VAT
cannot improve adversarial robust generalization.
Natural
Train
Accuracy
Natural
Test
Accuracy
Robust
Train
Accuracy
Robust
Test
Accuracy
Defense
Success
Rate
5k
PGD-adv on 5k 61.18 60.57 32.40 30.54 50.42
PASS (λ=0.1) 63.24 60.44 32.97 30.90 51.13
PASS (λ=0.2) 61.73 60.71 35.20 32.96 54.29
PASS (λ=0.3) 61.88 60.46 35.07 33.54 55.47
VAT 68.15 67.14 0.13 0.12 0.00
10k
PGD-adv on 10k 78.80 73.79 45.60 37.48 50.79
PASS (λ=0.1) 78.24 72.92 47.96 38.86 53.29
PASS (λ=0.2) 78.74 73.16 51.20 41.18 56.29
PASS (λ=0.3) 78.95 73.35 52.24 42.48 57.91
VAT 81.43 78.64 2.22 2.27 0.03
PGD-adv on 50k 99.91 85.40 96.71 49.99 58.54
Table 3: SSL experiment with 5k/10k labeled points (%)
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